Moments of Common Reference in Dialogic Communication: 
A Basis for Unconfused Collaboration in Unique Contexts

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The ‘otherness’ which enters into us makes us other. (Steiner, 1989: 188)

In point of fact the word is a two-sided act. It is determined equally by whose word it is and for whom it is meant. As word, it is precisely the product of the reciprocal relationship between speaker and listener, addressee and addressee. Each and every word expresses the ‘one’ in relation to the ‘other’... A word is a bridge thrown between myself and another... A word is territory shared by both addressee and addressee, by the speaker and his interlocutor. (Voloshinov, 1986: 86)

All these types of expression, each with its basic intonations, come rife with corresponding terms and corresponding forms of possible utterances. The social situation in all cases determines which term, which metaphor, and which form may develop in an utterance expressing [a felt experience] out of the particular intonational bearings of the experience. (Voloshinov, 1986: 89)

Logicians use examples which no one would ever think of using in any other connection. Whoever says: ‘Socrates is a man’? I am not criticizing this because it does not occur in practical life. What I am criticizing is the fact that logicians do not give these examples any life. We must invent a surrounding for our examples. (Wittgenstein, 2001: 124)

Only the intended picture reaches up to reality like a yardstick. Looked at from the outside, there it is lifeless and isolated” – It is as if at first we looked at a picture as so to enter into it... In this way, when we intend, we are surrounded by our intention’s pictures, and we are inside them... it means something to speak of “living in the pages of a book.” (Wittgenstein, 1981: no. 233)

Let me begin simply by asking a number of questions: What are the crucial features of our expressions that make it possible for those with whom we meet to come to a sense of us as the unique individuals we are? How can they get a sense, as sometimes they do, of the unique situation in which we live out our lives, a sense of “what it is like to be us”, of “what it is like to live in our world”? What is it in our exchanges with others that not only makes psychotherapy possible, but which also, in many other much more everyday situations, opens us up to the possibility of our being deeply changed in our living encounters with the others and othernesses around us, that is, changed in our ‘ways’ of thinking, ‘ways’ of seeing and hearing, ‘ways’ of ‘making connections’ between events, ‘ways’ of talking, and so on – in short, changes in the kind of person we are? What is it that makes it possible for us to occupy ‘a situation’ in common with others, for us all, seemingly, to be oriented toward the same ‘things’ in a shared situation? How might unconfused collaboration be possible – that is, a form of collaboration in which all participants involved continually update the common ground they share with each other?

For me, there are two major features of our expressions: (1) the importance of the spontaneous, living responsiveness of our living bodies both to each other and to the othernesses around us, and (2) the mirror image of the first: our communications should not take place within already devised codes of some kind, our expressions should not consist solely in deliberately chosen forms of expression – for, if the less controlled,
spontaneously occurring aspects of our everyday forms of communication are excluded, we will not, as we will see, be able to achieve fully collaborative forms of interaction; we will not be able to adapt our forms of communication to the very changes our communicating causes. Thus openings for their inclusion must, at least partially, exist in all of those communicative activities in which we wish to collaborate in achieving common ends.

The inclusion of these bodily displayed forms of spontaneous expression is important, I think, for at least the following four reasons:

1. The first is the possibility of our being able to establish what I will call shared moments of common reference with those around us.
2. Another is the possibility of our coming to an inner sense of an other’s way of being, of our being able to feel their inner movements within ourselves.
3. A third is the possibility of our coming to know ‘what it is like’ (Nagel, 1974) to be the unique person one meets in each of one’s daily encounters with the others around us, what their world is like.
4. Finally is the possibility of our being able to create uniquely novel ways of ‘going on’ in such situations, thus for us to move on from ‘stuck’ social relations to innovate new forms of relation.

But what is it that suggests these four reasons to me? What is so special about our spontaneous bodily responsiveness? What is the character of my living being in the world such that I find within myself: (a) the sense of a certain kind of difficulty, a specific disquiet, a disquiet with a ‘shape’ to it that can guide me in arriving at a explicit formulation of it; and (b) a feeling that can also guide me in my explorations of possible activities that might lead on to an evaluative resolution of it? It is the character of these ‘bodily feelings’ and their ‘guiding’ character that I want to explore in the following sections which discuss: “practical meanings,” “being struck,” “difficulties of the intellect and the will,” “utterances,” and “hearing”.

**Practical Meanings Occur in the Unfolding Movements Occurring in Our Meetings with the Others and Othernesses around Us**

These ‘guiding feelings’ first occur to us, not in contemplation, not in our theorizing – although we could not conduct any of our ‘inner movements’ in a sensibly sequenced fashion without them – but in our everyday, practical encounters with the others and othernesses around us. It is in the movements that occur in our meetings with those around us that such ‘shaped’ feelings occur.

Indeed, as Wittgenstein (1953) puts it: “We want to say: ‘When we mean something, it’s like going up to someone, it’s not having a dead picture (of any kind)’... ‘When one means something, it is oneself meaning’; so one is oneself in motion [italics added]. One is rushing ahead and so cannot also observe oneself rushing ahead... meaning something is like going up to someone” (Wittgenstein, 1953, nos 455, 456, 457).

Thus, as I see it, there are certain crucial moments in human affairs, in our active, living relations with the others around us, when a second person spontaneously responds to the utterances (or other expressions) of a first – both by actively listening and responsively replying to them – that a ‘living connection’ between them both can be created, a moment that, following Bakhtin (1986), we might call a ‘dialogical moment’ – or which, originally, I called a moment of “joint action” (Shotter, 1980), and later, an “interactive moment” (Shotter, 1993, p. 2). Central to the occurrence of such moments, is the spontaneous, living responsiveness of our bodies, both to the others and to the ‘othernesses’ around us, a responsiveness that we are often unaware of, but which we cannot wholly eradicate within ourselves. For if we did, then we would be quite unable to routinely understand each other; we would have to undertake complex deliberations in trying to ‘work out’ each others meanings in our expressions.

Once we accept the important role played by our spontaneous, bodily responsiveness in our understandings of each other’s utterances, then we begin to see that another kind of account – rather than the usual representational-referential account we offer ourselves at the moment – is needed. We also need what I will call, a relational-responsive account.
As Bakhtin (1986) puts it: “All real and integral understanding is actively responsive... And the speaker himself is oriented precisely toward such an actively responsive understanding. He does not expect [italics added] passive understanding that, so to speak, only duplicates his or her own idea in someone else’s mind... Rather, the speaker talks with an expectation [italics added] of a response, agreement, sympathy, objection, execution, and so forth...” (p. 69).

Indeed, more than merely being actively responsive to another’s utterance – a responsiveness that is displayed in our expectations of what an other will say next – we also understand them as speaking from within a particular relation to us. Hence, “… the meaning of the word pertains to a particular actual reality and particular real conditions of speech communication... [thus] we do not understand the meaning of a given word simply as a word of a language; rather, we assume an active responsive position with respect to it (sympathy, agreement or disagreement, stimulus to action). Thus, expressive intonation [italics added] belongs to the utterance and not to the word” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 86).

This is crucial, for it is central to the main point of what I want to put forward to you here in this article: the issue of what it is in the ‘otherness’ of others that can enter us and make us ‘other’ (than we were). But for the moment, I want to stay at the more general level, to say a little bit more about the possibilities for creativity and innovation that can be detected in the spontaneously occurring, dialogical moments in our living, face-to-face interactions. So I will return to expand on it further in a moment.

### Being ‘Struck’: Moments when the ‘Otherness’ of the Other Enters Us and Makes Us Other

Sometimes, in our interactions, events occur that are a little different from what we routinely expect. Indeed, we often ‘mark’ such events by saying that we were ‘struck’ by them, or ‘arrested’ or ‘moved’, or ‘touched’ by them. Wittgenstein (1980) noted the importance of such events, as being the possible beginnings of new language-games: “The origin and the primitive form of the language game is a reaction;” he said, “only from this can more complicated forms develop. Language – I want to say – is a refinement, ‘in the beginning was the deed’ (quoting Goethe)” (p. 31). “But what is the word ‘primitive’ meant to say here?” he went on to ask, “Presumably that this sort of behavior is pre-linguistic: that a language-game is based on it, that it is the prototype of a way of thinking and not the result of thought” (1981, no.541) – where, “the primitive reaction may have been a glance or a gesture, but it may also have been a word” (1953, p. 218).

In other words, what Wittgenstein is noting here, like Freud, is that there can be subtle ‘evidences’ displayed in a speaker’s utterances which can give listeners an opening into a speaker’s inner world. Freud, of course, believed that those words that clients paused over when asked to associate freely to them, were words indicative of conflicts in their lives.

Thus, picking up on what is actually expressed in our uttering of a word, or of a sequence of words, is what I want to talk about here. I want to try to focus on what can be heard in our words in their speaking, not what can be understood (as in studies in linguistics) from examining patterns of already spoken words. But, of course, trying to focus on the unique ‘time contours’ of the ‘inner feelings’ aroused as the effects of another’s utterance unfold within us, is not easy to do. It requires, as we shall see, a special kind of discipline. For we need to attend to events that are always occurring in the ‘background’ of the more ‘foreground’ activities we do deliberately; these background events, usually occurring without our awareness, are in fact what make our more deliberate activities possible. Thus, it is a discipline very different from the one into which we have been trained, in the Western world, beginning even as young children.

In learning number patterns, or later, doing theorems in Euclidean geometry or algebraic equations, for instance, we are trained in a way of reasoning that depends upon ‘seeing’ that two (or more) formal patterns, although located at different places at different times, are identical. It is a style of reasoning that trains us into developing a sense of what certainty in formal reasoning feels like. Hence, later, if we ever turn to philosophy, we find it quite ‘natural’ to accept Descartes’s (1968) appeal to a self-given certainty, and his resolve “to study no other science than that which [he] could find within himself or else in the great book of the world” (p. 35). Indeed, where else – other than in our selves (subjectively), or in the world (objectively) – might we look for the foundations of our knowings and understandings?
Thus, against this kind of background, in which such sure certainty seems to be possible, Wittgenstein’s (1969) claim – that “I want to regard man here as an animal... As a creature in a primitive state... Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination” (no. 475), but in a much more unclear and chaotic form of activity, a form of activity that occurs only between people in their meetings – seems to be a major retreat from reason.

But I think that this is what we must do. We must understand our more self-conscious abilities as social constructions, as achievements that we can only accomplish with the help of others, achievements that we must struggle to accomplish afresh – for yet “another first time,” as Garfinkel 1967, p. 9) puts it – in each new, particular situation we encounter.

Thus, if we are to follow Wittgenstein, we must consider those aspects of our living activities that are always present, unnoticed, in the background, that ‘set the scene’, so to speak, for all our more willful and intellectual acts as individuals. And to do this, rather than looking inwards and backwards toward the past (with the aim of understanding their causes), if we are understand their workings, we must look outwards and forwards, towards how we can responsively create between us, in our more spontaneous and non-deliberate acts, ways of ‘going on’ together within which our more individual ways of acting intellectually and willfully can be understood by the others around us. It is this bringing into the foreground of our intellectual considerations, their usually unnoticed ‘background’ that, I think, is one of Wittgenstein’s major achievements.

Two Kinds of Difficulties: Difficulties of the Intellect and Difficulties of the Will

Indeed, as a consequence, as Wittgenstein (1980) sees it, there are two very different kinds of difficulties we can face in our lives: difficulties of the intellect, and difficulties of the will (p. 17). We can formulate difficulties of the intellect as problems which, with the aid of clever theories, we can solve by the use of reasoning. Difficulties of the will, however, are quite different. For they are to do with how we orient ourselves bodily towards events occurring around us, how we relate ourselves to them, the ways in which we see them, hear them, experience them, value them – for it is these are the ways that determine, that ‘give shape to’, the lines of action we further resolve on carrying out. But we must do all this while we are already in action, in motion. As soon as we stop moving in relation to one or another purpose in our surroundings, our relations to our surroundings cease to be structured by the goals and aims implicit in our movements, and become structured by this, that, or some other way of thinking – thus to substitute a very different system of organizational valences.

This distinction is not easy to grasp, for differences between difficulties of orientation and difficulties of the intellect cannot be captured formally, they can only be captured in practice with respect to practical criteria.

Wittgenstein (1980) calls these two kinds of difficulty, respectively, difficulties of the intellect and difficulties of the will:

What makes a subject hard to understand ... is not that before you can understand it you need to be trained in abstruse matters, but the contrast between understanding the subject and what most people want to see... What has to be overcome is a difficulty having to do with the will, rather than with the intellect. (p. 17)

Thus, as Wittgenstein puts it, what work in (his kind of practical) philosophy is aimed at, is not to provide any new information, but to change one in oneself, to change “one’s way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them)” (1980, p. 16).

Thus, if these changes cannot be effected by giving people good reasons to adopt new beliefs, by argument, how can one by changed? One must be changed in one’s very being, and that can only be effected by being ‘moved’ by an other or otherness in ways that one is unable to move oneself. As Steiner (1989) so nicely puts it: It is: “The ‘otherness’ which enters into us makes us other” (p. 188).

As a consequence of our embodied living responsiveness to events in our surroundings, aspects of our utterances (and other responsive expressions) can be ‘shaped’ by influences in our immediate situation, as well as by those we also embody from our past experiences. As Voloshinov (1986) puts it, in such dialogical moments, “the immediate social
situation and the broader social milieu wholly determine – and determine from within – the structure of an utterance” (p. 86, his italics) – the organizing centre is neither wholly within the individual psyche, nor within the linguistic system, “each and every word expresses the ‘one’ in relation to the ‘other.’ I give myself verbal shape from another's point of view, ultimately, from the point of view of the community to which I belong” (p. 86). As a consequence, the surroundings of our utterances – or, their background – must be accounted as “determining surroundings,” in the sense that, in our being unavoidably responsive to events occurring within them, they exert ‘calls’ upon us to act responsively in relation to them in ‘fitting’ ways.

Our Utterances ‘Manifest’ the Character of Their Surroundings in the Temporal-Contours of Their Unfolding: Achieving a Shared Situation

Voloshinov (1987) gives a nice example of the depth and complexity of what can be heard in the utterance of even a single word, and the character of what, relationally, it can achieve. He describes a situation in which there are two people sitting in a room. They are both silent. Then one of them says, ‘Well!’ in a strongly intonated voice. The other does not respond.

As Voloshinov notes, for us, as outsiders, this entire ‘conversation’ is utterly opaque. Taken in isolation, the utterance ‘Well!’ is empty and unintelligible. Yet, for the two people involved, this single expressively intoned word makes perfect sense; it is a fully meaningful and complete utterance. How can this be?

At the time the utterance took place, the two Russians involved, looked up at the window and saw that it had begun to snow; both knew that it was already May and that it was high time for spring to come; finally, both were sick and tired of the protracted winter – they both were looking forward to the spring and both were bitterly disappointed by the late snowfall. “On the ‘jointly seen’ (snowflakes outside the window), ‘jointly known’ (time of year – May) and ‘unanimously evaluated’ (winter wearied of, spring looked forward to) – on all this the utterance directly depends, all this is seized in its actual living import – is its very sustenance. And yet all this remains without verbal specification or articulation. The snowflakes remain outside the window; the date, on the page of the calendar; the evaluation, in the psyche of the speaker; and nevertheless, all this is assumed in the word well” (Voloshinov, 1987, p. 99). But what is the point of such an utterance, what is achieved in its voicing?

It is perfectly obvious that it does not at all reflect, accurately describe, or represent the extraverbal situation confronting the two Russians. Nevertheless, it achieves something of great importance. As Voloshinov (1987) so rightly remarks, the utterance here “resolves the situation, bringing it to an evaluative conclusion, as it were” (p. 100), and in so doing, it works to join the participants in the situation together as co-participants who know, understand, and evaluate the situation in a like manner – for the other, the listener expresses his or her agreement by being silent!

In other words, rather than achieving something representational and intellectual in each of the individuals separately, the utterance achieves something bodily and relational in both together; it works to create a shared orientation toward their shared situation – a moment of common reference. Both now know that they feel the same in relation to the situation; they share it, and to this extent, they can share various expectations of each other regarding each other's actions in their shared situation.

Indeed, if one person responds to another in a way sensitive to the relations between their actions and the actions of the other, so that they can come to act in anticipation of each other’s responses, then they can be said, in some small degree, to trust each other. But if a second person feels the first to be pursuing an agenda of his or her own, then not only will that second person feel ethically offended at the first's lack of respect for them, they will also feel ethically offended at that persons’ lack of respect for ‘their’ joint endeavors (Goffman, 1967).

Thus, far from the extraverbal situation being merely the external cause of the utterance – by, say, exerting an impact on the speaker – it “enters the utterance,” says Voloshinov (1987), “as an essential constitutive part of the structure of its import” (p. 100). It enters it, in influencing the intonational contour in the voicing of the word ‘Well’. Indeed, the speaker could almost equally as well have uttered not a word at all, but simply an ‘Ughh!’ In other words, in general, the influence of interest to us, is an influence exerted, to repeat, not in a pattern of already spoken words; it is in the unfolding temporal contours of words in their speaking. Thus for Voloshinov (1986), “the constituent factor for the linguistic form, as for the sign, is not at all its self-identity as signal but its specific variability; and the constituent

factor for understanding the linguistic form is not recognition of “the same thing,” but understanding in the proper sense of the word, i.e., orientation in the particular, given context and in the particular, given situation-orientation in the dynamic process of becoming and not “orientation” in some inert state” (p. 69, my emphasis) – a variability manifested in the unique temporal-contours of an utterance as it responsively unfolds in time

But how can the unfolding temporal contours of people’s utterances work, not only to achieve such an evaluative sharing of a situation, but also to express a person’s own relation to their own expressions within it – whether they mean them to be taken seriously, treated as mere proposals, or even to be ridiculed (or so on)? And further: In situations in which our talk is not intertwined in with aspects of an immediately shared context, but in which we only talk with each other – as in academic seminar rooms, organizational conference rooms, or in psychotherapy, say – and do nothing else, is it still possible for us to gain, from the pausing, pacing, and intoning of their talk, a good sense of the invisible world of an other, and of their relations to it?

If it is, in what kind of world must we live for such happenings to be possible, for the temporal contours of people’s expressions to work on and in us to such effects?

Thus, if it is the case that (in at least some of their aspects) all our activities are to an extent ‘shaped’ by our body’s ineradicable responsiveness to the unique character of their surrounding context, then any inquiry into their nature that fails to take account of this – any inquiry that is driven by ‘ready-made’ textbook-methods, say, or any ‘interviews’ conducted in accord with pre-established ‘schedules’ – will inevitably miss important aspects of our activities. Indeed, they will miss just those aspects that make people’s activities and their utterances unique, both to the persons concerned and to the situations within which they occur. They will fail to do justice to what a particular person meant by saying what they did, their ‘point’, what they were trying to achieve at that particular moment in time and space – an ethical failure not only to fully respect how, what they expressed in their utterance, mattered to them, but, as we shall see, an ethical failure also to sustain the sense of an ‘us’, of a collective-we, of all those of us who are involved in the communication in question, being influenced in the same way by the same determining surroundings.

Hearing Both ‘Who’ is Speaking, and From ‘Where’ They are Speaking, in the Unfolding Contours of People’s Utterances

All the remarks above, as I hope is now becoming clear, begin to orient us very differently toward our use of language than the more usual referential-representational accounts. Taken altogether, they begin to suggest that we can hear in people’s utterances, as they unfold moment-by-moment, what a unique person takes his or her unique world to be. But more than this, we can also hear how what they take to be their unique relation to it at that moment also enters into and shapes the intonational contours of their utterance. Indeed, we can ‘hear’ their struggle to find their own unique ‘way’ forward – for yet “another first time” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 9) – is the pausing, hesitations, and other ‘wanderings’ exhibited in their utterances. But, let me emphasize once again, all these aspects of people’s utterances are, very largely, uttered as an aspect of the living responsiveness of our bodies to the others and ‘othernesses’ around us.

As a consequence, this stream of spontaneously responsive, living activity, constitutes the constantly changing background of activity from out of which our more deliberately conducted activities can be drawn, and into which their results can return – what earlier I called the determining surroundings of our activities. If this is the case, the consequences are prodigious! It means that all spoken utterances contain within themselves the ‘reciprocal’, as it were, of the particular circumstances in which, for the speaker, they are uttered. And thus written (or otherwise recorded) utterances can also – in their style – manifest aspects of the circumstances in which they might at first have been uttered. Thus, if we know how to listen for them, or to read for them, we can hear in written or recorded utterances – if not the actual, original conditions that worked to shape them in their speaking or writing – at least the possible human situations, etc., of their use.

Merleau-Ponty (1962) makes a similar set of points in claiming that in everyday, spontaneous talk, listeners do not need to interpret a speaker’s utterances to grasp his or her thought, for “the listener receives thought from speech itself” (p. 178). It is present in the way in which speakers ‘give shape’ to their utterances. Thus the “conceptual meaning” of a speaker’s words “must be formed by a kind of deduction from a gestural meaning, which is immanent in speech. And as in a foreign country, I begin to understand the meaning of words through their place in a context of action, and by taking part in communal life” (p. 179).

In effect, we must ask ourselves: What kind of person, in what kind of situation, to what other kind of person, for what reason, would say such things? That is, what is being done by the use of these words, what is their point, what are
people trying to achieve in using their words in this way? If we can do this, if we can reproduce the tone and accent of the speaker, we can begin to feel, he suggests, our way into their existential manner, the way speakers are using their words. We can begin to understand the meaning of their words in terms of their role in a particular context of action. In fact, all our speech (and writing) carries its relational meaning in its tone. “There is thus,” Merleau-Ponty (1962) concludes, “either in the man who listens or reads, or in the one who speaks or writes, a thought in speech the existence of which is unsuspected by intellectualism” (p. 179).

Conclusions

What is central to everything above, then, is the move away from the idea of speech communication as being a process of information transmission, of the speaker as a source of information, of speech being a common code into which one puts one’s thoughts, and of listeners as simply being decoders who have to task of arriving at the speaker’s thought. This ‘model’ of the communication process eradicates the role of two major aspects of the communication situation: (1) The spontaneous, living, expressive-responsiveness of our bodies, thus leaving listeners as passive listeners – in this situation, “the active role of the other in the process of speech communication is... reduced to a minimum” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 70). (2) The other, is the role of what I have called the ‘determining surroundings’ of our utterance, the (often invisible) surroundings which, in our being spontaneously responsive to them in the voicing of our utterances, on the one hand, give shape not only the intonational contours of our utterances, but also to their whole style, to our word choices, to the metaphors we use and so on. But which, on the other, orients us toward the ‘place’ of our utterances in our world, toward where they should be located or toward what aspect they are relevant, and toward where next we might we might go, i.e., their point – what they are trying to ‘construct’ in speaking as they are.

In other words, it is crucial to bring our words back from their ‘free-floating’ use – whether it be in committee or seminar rooms, in psychotherapy, in strategic planning in businesses, on the internet, or in just general conversations in sitting rooms – to their use within a shared set of “determining surroundings.” That is, it is crucial if we are to understand how the “specific variability” in a speaker’s expressions are expressive both of his or her unique ‘inner world’, and of the unique ‘point’ he or she wants to express, to make, in relation to their world.

Indeed, this is Wittgenstein’s (1953) whole point in suggesting that: “When philosophers use a word – ‘knowledge’, ‘being’, ‘object’, ‘I’, ‘proposition’, ‘name’ – and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home? – What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use” (no.116). For, as he realized, all these ‘big words’, as we might call them, remain undetermined and empty – and thus open to endless philosophical argument and interpretation – when divorced from their home in an everyday circumstance.

For it is only when our words are at home in the determining surroundings of their everyday use, that we can express our true identities as the unique individuals that we are or can be – any requirement that we express ourselves only within an established codes is a limitation on who we are or can be. And it is our living openness to the specific variations in the expressions of others that can allow their ‘otherness’ to enter us and make us other than we already are.

References


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**Endnotes**

1. William James (1890) broached this issue very nicely more than a 100 years ago in his famous *The stream of thought* chapter: “The truth is that large tracts of human speech are nothing but *signs of direction* in thought, of which direction we have nevertheless an acutely discriminating sense, though no definite sensorial image plays any part in it whatsoever... If we try to hold fast to the feeling of direction, the full presence comes and the feeling of direction is lost... Now what I contend for, and accumulate examples to show, is that ‘tendencies’ are not only descriptions from
without, but they are among the objects of the stream, which is thus aware of them from within, and must be described as in very large measure constituted of feelings of tendency, often so vague that we are unable to name them at all” (James, 1890, pp.253-254). My suggestion is that, it is not just in the stream of thought, that we make use of what he describes as feelings of tendency, but in all our everyday activities.

2. Elsewhere, Arlene Katz and I (Katz & Shotter, 1996, 1998, 2004) have developed a whole approach to social inquiry, what we call the methods of a social poetics, built around being ‘struck by’ the occurrence of certain events.

3. “Perhaps what is inexpressible (what I find mysterious and am not able to express) is the background against which whatever I could express has its meaning” (Wittgenstein, 1980, p.16).

4. Here, I am following Voloshinov’s text quite closely.

5. “The linguistic consciousness of the speaker and of the listener-understander, in the practical business of living speech, is not at all concerned with the abstract system of normatively identical forms of language, but with language-speech in the sense of the aggregate of possible contexts of usage for a particular linguistic form. For a person speaking his native tongue, a word presents itself not as an item of vocabulary but as a word that has been used in a variety of utterances by co-speaker A, co-speaker B, co-speaker C and so on, and has been variously used in the speaker’s own utterances. A very special and specific kind of orientation is necessary, if one is to go from there to the self-identical word belonging to the lexicological system of the language in question – the dictionary word” (Voloshinov, 1986, p.70).

6. Let me emphasis here that by gestural meaning, Merleau-Ponty (1962) means to draw our attention to what I have called the “determining surroundings” of our utterances, the “particular context of action” in which they first appeared. When we do that, when we imaginatively work back from an utterance to the particular situation in which it must (or might) have occurred, then we find that the meaning of people’s more ‘free-floating’ utterances become clear to us. Thus: “In the same way,” Merleau-Ponty (1962) continues, “an as yet imperfectly understood piece of philosophical writing discloses to me at least a certain ‘style’ – either a Spinozist, criticist or phenomenological one – which is the first draft of its meaning. I begin to understand a philosophy by feeling my way into its existential manner, by reproducing the tone and accent of the philosopher” (p.179).